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BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
*•—odoOooo 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
I M >ll, . < * • . , , i *-d 1 I i' . ...... 
This is a criminal case in which the Appellant was con-
victed of distributing for value a controlled substance in 
violation of Utah Code Ann* §58-37-8(1) A(a)(ii) (1953). 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
On July 2, 1975, the Defendant-Appellant was tried to a 
jury before the Honorable Allen B. Sorensen and found guilty 
of the offehse of Unlawful Distribution of a Controlled Sub-
stance for Valu6. 
kELlEF SOUGHT Oti APPEAL 
Appellant, Carlton Curtis, seeks a vacation of the jury 
Verdict arid a judgment of not guilty notwithstanding the 
-1-
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verdict of the jury, or in the alternative, a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
, _
 ( 
The testimony at trial indicates that the following 
events transpired. 
The Appellant was tried and found guilty by a jury 
on July 2, 1975 for the offense of Unlawful Distribution 
for Value of the Controlled Substance - lysergic acid die-
thylamide (LSD) to the State's chief witness Mary Lee Bosh. 
Mary Bosh testified in substance as follows: She met 
with police officers at the Region Four Task Force office 
in Provo, was searched, her car was searched and she was 
given money with which to purchase drugs. She went from 
that meeting to meet Karen Davis who took her to the Provo 
Western Motel where she met with Defendant. There she 
asked to buy some "acid" and the Defendant sold her three 
squares for ten dollars. She thereupon left the motel, 
took Karen Davis home and met with police whom she delivered 
the "acid". (TR 10-13). 
Mary Bosh further testified that she was a paid infor-
mant and that she was paid a commission based on the value 
of drugs she was able to buy. (TR 13,14). ••* 
Other witnesses for the state corroborated the testi-
mony of Mary Bosh as it related to the times prior to enter-
ing the motel and after returning to the police. (TR 18,20). 
They also testified that the "acid" was delivered to 
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Dr. Wesley Parrish for testing (TR 23,24) and that test-
ing indi cated 11 1 at i t was 1ysergi c acid di ethy1amide. 
(TR 8) . 
Karen Davis and the Defendant testified that during 
the tine Mary Bosh was i n 1 :! le mot ;el w:i ti I them, no one sold 
her anything, (TR 2 6,28). 
The Defendant subsequen11 y subnii 11ed an af f idavit of 
bias on. the part of a juror which di d not become known to 
defense counsel until after the trial, (R 17,18). One of 
the jurors had beei I a super visor of the Defendant at a 
previous job and had reprimanded him on occasion, He di d 
not make these facts known at voir dire, 
Judgment was pronounced i i I December , ] 9 75. (R 13). .— 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
TliV, TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF THE APPELLANT'S MOTION . "• 
FOR A NEW TRIAL IS MANIFEST ABUSE OF DISCRETION TO rnHE " 
PREJUDICE OF THE APPELLANT AND A hWJIAh OK HI IJ RIGiHTi UWUfclK 
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, THE UTAH CONSTITUTION, AND 
THE UTAH CODE,. 
Appellantf s affidavit (R. 2 7 ,18) establishes that Appel-
lant had grounds for challenging a juror for implied bias 
had the juror's answers to voir dire revealed his relation-
ship to the Appellant. §77-30-19 Utah Code Annotated (1953), 
provides that a challenge for implied bias may be taken for 
-3-
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standing in relation of master and servant. That a juror 
and the Defendant had been master and servant was not dis~ 
puted by the State. 
The rule in Utah is that the trial court has discre-
tion to grant or refuse new trials and an appellate court
 ( 
will not disturb the trial courts ruling unless this dis-
cretion has been abused to the prejudice of the Defendant. 
State v. Weaver, 78 U. 555, 6 P.2d 167; State v. Draper, 
83 U. 115, 27 P.2d 39. 
Anything which is good cause for challenge is good 
cause for a new trial if not known to the party or his 
counsel before the verdict and failure to grant a new trial 
under the circumstances is an abuse of discretion. State 
v. Guyn, 87 U. 320, 48 P.2d 902. See also Lindemann v. 
San Joaquin Cotton Oil Co., 55 P.2d 870 (Cal.); Wilson v. 
Wiggins, 94 P.2d 870 (Ariz.); Olympic Realty Co. v. Kramer, 
141 S.W.2d 293 (Ky.); 66 C.J.S. 115 §22; 88 A.L.R. 917. 
In this case it appears that the jury verdict must 
have been based on the relative credibility of the State's 
narcotics agent and the defense witnesses. Any bias of a 
juror against the Appellant would certainly prejudice the 
Defendant in the jury's evaluation of relative credibility. 
In State v. Anderson, 65 U. 415, 237 P. 941, it was 
held that where a juror rode back and forth to the court-
house with a witness who took an active role in the prose-
-4-
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cution the Defendant was not given a trial by an impartial 
jury as required by the Utah and United States Constitu-
tions. Constitution of Utah, Article I, §12; Constitution 
of the United States, Article I, §12. 
In State V. Guyn, supra, bias was implied because of 
the jurors position as a deputy sheriff where the sheriff 
was the person on whose complaint the prosecution was 
instituted. Such position consitutes grounds for challenge 
under the same section as is relied upon by the Appellant 
herein. The rule in that case, in State v. Anderson, supra, 
and the weight of authority in other jurisdictions, if 
applied herein, would entitle the Appellant to a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in denying the Appellant a new 
trial and the Judgment should be reversed. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
JOHN G. MULLINER 
MULLINER & MCCULLOUGH 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
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